نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

استادیار جامعه شناسی دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران

چکیده

این مقاله به بررسی نظریاتی می‌پردازد که از نیمه قرن گذشته درباره کشورهای غنی از منابع طبیعی شکل گرفته‌اند. در این راستا نظریات برآمده از ادبیات توسعه و همچنین گفتمان‌ها و نظریات دولت رانتی، بیماری هلندی و نفرین منابع و نظریات نهادی که تلاش داشته‌اند ساختار سیاسی، اقتصادی، فرهنگی و اجتماعی این کشورها را بررسی نمایند مورد تحلیل قرار گرفته‌اند و تحولات آن‌ها تا زمانه حاضر بررسی شده است. در اینجا، ضمن اشاره به محورهای اصلی این نظریات و نقد درون و برون گفتمانی آن‌ها، خلأهای نظری و تجربی این نظریه‌ها برجسته شده و تلاش شده است با تأکید بر نقاط قوت و ضعف آن‌ها امکانی برای نقادی و بازسازی این نظریات و گفتمان‌ها فراهم گردد. مسیری که ضمن ارائه مروری انتقادی بر نظریات موجود، می‌تواند راه را برای مطالعات تجربی آینده هموارتر سازد. بر این مبنا بی‌توجهی به ریشه‌های تاریخی شکل‌گیری دولت و اقتصاد در بسیاری از این جریانات پژوهشی و نیز ویژگی خاص پرداخت به مسئله سیاست و دولت در جریانات دیگر و نیز تحلیل نظام‌های اجتماعی این کشورها بر اساس الگوهای استاندارد در اغلب گفتمان‌های مربوطه، در روایتی که در مقاله حاضر ارائه شده است مورد تأکید قرار گرفته‌اند.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

A Critical Review of Theories Concerning Resource Rich Countries

نویسنده [English]

  • Mehdi Omidi

Assistant Professor of Sociology, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran , Iran

چکیده [English]

This article deals with reviewing theories developed from the middle of the last century about countries with abundant natural resources. In this regard, related theories in development literature as well as discourses and theories of Rentier State, Dutch disease, resource curse and also institutionalist theories that tried to evaluate the political, economic, cultural and social structures of these countries have been analysed. Furthermore, their changes to date were also explored.  While referring to the main claims of these theories as well as the internal and external criticisms, the current article tries to highlight their theoretical and empirical gaps. An attempt was also made to allow criticizing and reformulating these theories and discourses by emphasizing on their strength and weaknesses points. This can pave the way for future empirical studies while also providing a critical review of available theories. On this basis, the problems neglecting the historical roots of the formation of the state and economy in many of these research currents, special feature of addressing the issue of politics and state in other currents, and the analysis of the social systems of these countries based on standard patterns in most related discourses, have been emphasized in the narrative presented in this article.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Resource Rich Countries
  • Rentier State
  • Resourse Curse
  • Institutional Analysis
  • Dutch Disease
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